We illustrate AL SP (Action Language for Security Protocol), a declarative executable specification language for planning attacks to security protocols. AL SP is based on logic programming with negation as failure, and with stable model semantics. In AL SP we can give a declarative specification of a protocol with the natural semantics of send and receive actions which can be performed in parallel. By viewing a protocol trace as a plan to achieve a goal, attacks are (possibly parallel) plans achieving goals that correspond to security violations. Building on results from logic programming and planning, we map the existence of an attack into the existence of a model for the protocol that satisfies the specification of an attack. We show that our liberal model of parallel actions can adequately represent the traditional Dolev-Yao trace-based model used in the formal analysis of security protocols. Specifications in AL SP are executable, as we can automatically search for attacks via an efficient model generator (smodels), implementing the stable model semantics of normal logic programs.
INTRODUCTION
Large open networks where trusted and untrusted parties coexist and where messages transit through potentially "curious" if not hostile providers pose new challenges to the designers of communication protocols.
Properties such as authenticity, confidentiality, proof of identity, proof of delivery, or receipt are difficult to assure in this scenario. Security protocols, communications protocols with an essential use of cryptographic primitives, aim at solving this problem [Schneier 1994, Chapters 2-4] . By a suitable use of shared and public key cryptography, random numbers, hash functions, encrypted and plain messages, a security protocol may assure an agent that the "invisible" responder at the other side of the network really is who he claims to be.
Not surprisingly, security protocols are very difficult to design by hand, as errors may creep in by combining protocols actions in ways not foreseen by the designer [Burrows et al. 1990] . Indeed, a protocol may be discovered flawed after many years [Lowe 1996] , and even when one proves it correct, shortcuts to obtain export licenses can make it flawed [Ryan and Schneider 1998 ]. This situation is further complicated by the often ambiguous definition of the goals of a security protocol, which makes it difficult to assess what really counts as a flaw [Burrows et al. 1990; Gollmann 1996; Lowe 1996; Syverson and Meadows 1996] .
Thus, the formal verification of security protocols became the subject of intense research in the last decade, after the seminal paper by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham [Burrows et al. 1990 ]. For instance, methods based on beliefs logics [Burrows et al. 1990; Syverson and van Oorschot 1994] , model checking and verification in process algebras [Lowe 1996; Schneider 1998 ], theorem proving with induction [Paulson 1998; Bella and Paulson 1998 ], and state exploration methods [Mitchell et al. 1997; Meadows 1994] have been successfully used to verify and debug security protocols.
However, it became apparent that the formalization process itself was a serious bottleneck in the design process. At first, formalizing a protocol was hardly doable by somebody different from the proposer of the formal method itself. Second, the ambiguity of the goals of the protocol made it possible to find "attacks" with formal methods that security analysts will never regard as such (see for instance the debate between Lowe [1996] and Gollmann [1996] ). Indeed, a security analyst can easily define a "security violation" in terms of sent, received, and missing messages, while the language gap between the analyst and the formal method makes it difficult to formally and exactly capture what is needed.
To bridge the gap, a number of intermediate languages for the description of protocols and protocol specifications have been proposed in the literature: for example CASPER [Lowe 1998 ], CASPL [Brackin et al. 1999] , and NAPTRL [Syverson and Meadows 1996] . The protocol description is close to the operational description used in the security literature, and a compiler takes care of mapping it into the target formal language. Nevertheless, this situation is still unsatisfactory, as the security analyst must still buy, stock and barrel, the definitions of security goals and other properties (such as properties of private and public keys, the abilities of an intruder, etc.) which are provided by the formal analyst. For instance, it is often not possible for the security analyst to "customize" the capabilities of a potential intruder (e.g., the intruder can intercept all messages coming from Alice but not those coming from Bob, etc.) without hacking into the formal language.
Thus, one would like to further extend the possibilities of specification languages, to allow for a flexible description of protocol actions, protocol goals, and protocol environment.
The Contribution of this Paper
In this paper we illustrate AL SP (Action Language for Security Protocols [Carlucci Aiello and Massacci 2000] ), an executable specification language for representing security protocols, and checking the possibility of attacks.
Our goal in the design of AL SP is to provide the designer of security protocols with a formal environment where the logical formalization of a protocol and the behavior of an intruder are as close as possible to the operational specification in terms of message passing as one can find in published descriptions of protocols. An attack to a protocol should be easily specifiable in terms of the operations that one would or would not like to happen, without worrying about initiators, responders, or sessions. Properties of messages, keys, etc., should be easily formalized in the language.
Finally, the logical formalization should be executable, at least for model checking: there should be a system that takes the specification and outputs a model (if any) which shows an attack.
AL SP is based on logic programming with the stable model semantics (LP SM ), and is executable via a model finder, namely smodels [Niemelä 1999 ].
The choice of LP SM [Apt 1990; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988] is motivated by three properties of stable models:
-if a fact is true in a stable model there is a justification for it, and no circular justification is allowed; -if something is not explicitly said, it is false by default; -it is possible to say that some facts must be true in a stable model, and other facts may be true in it.
As we shall see, this is particularly appropriate in dynamic domains representing actions and changes, such as security protocols. The innovative aspect of our proposal is the way we use logic programs to formalize protocols. The point of view we take comes from robotic planning. Planning, if seen as an artificial intelligence problem, is the task of automatically generating the sequence of actions a robot should perform to achieve its goal. The logic approach to planning sees plan generation as a task of automated reasoning: out of a declarative specification of the world, the (constructive) proof of the existence of a goal state can be easily transformed into a plan (i.e., a sequence of actions) to achieve it. Conversely, the nonexistence of a plan can be checked as an unsatisfiability problem: if no model for a goal state can be found, then we have proven that there is no plan that achieves it.
A plan is not different from a trace of a protocol. As in Paulson's approach for verifying security protocols [Paulson 1998; Bella and Paulson 1998 ], we describe each protocol run as a trace of send and receive actions. Paulson relies on inductive theorem proving for proving a protocol correct; we rely on stable-model generation for model-checking the protocol and finding traces corresponding to attacks.
Thus, our method, based on a logical specification for model-checking security protocols, offers an alternative to process algebras [Lowe 1996; ] and state exploration methods [Meadows 1994; Mitchell et al. 1997] , and complements Paulson's inductive approach [Paulson 1998 ].
Plan of the Paper
In the rest of the paper we introduce security protocols by means of a simple running example (see Section 2). Then we briefly give some background on logic programs, stable models and smodels (Section 3), and on the logic approach to planning (Section 4). We then present the language AL SP (Section 5), and show how to use it for modeling protocols (Sections 6 and 7) and attacks (Section 8). Finally, we show how to use them in practice (Section 9) and then discuss the adequacy of AL SP specifications w.r.t. the standard trace-based semantics of security protocols (Section 10). A discussion on related works concludes the paper (Section 11). We refer instead to Carlucci Aiello and Massacci [2001] for a detailed presentation of some case studies: the Needham-Schroeder protocol, and the Aziz-Diffie key agreement protocol for mobile communication.
SECURITY PROTOCOLS: AN INTRODUCTION
As we anticipated in the introduction, a security protocol is a particular type of communication protocol in which cryptographic primitives play a key role. Here we sketch some features of security protocols and refer to Schneier [1994] for further details and references.
At first, when reasoning about the correctness of security protocols, there is a simplifying assumption about cryptographic primitives: they are almost perfect 1 so that cryptographic attacks are out of scope. The basic setting of a security protocol, which has been first proposed by Dolev and Yao [1983] , is constituted by two honest agents (say Alice and Bob), who want to communicate over a network owned by a potentially hostile agent (Charlie), and who use the services of one trusted server (Sam). Charlie may intercept, read, and fake any message in transit, but cannot break, nor alter, encrypted components (unless he knows the decryption keys). In more sophisticated protocols, such as an e-commerce protocol, we may have a trusted third party (Trent), who intervenes in case of disputes or who provides unrepudiable evidence that certain transactions took place. There are of course variations on this theme: there might be more agents or servers with different tasks; Alice may not entirely trust Bob, etc.
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-aliveness is sought when Alice follows the protocol and has some assurance that Bob is alive on the network (even if talking with somebody else); -authenticity means that whenever Alice follows the protocol and gets a message allegedly from Bob, then Bob actually sent the message (possibly to Alice, depending on how strong we want authentication to be); -confidentiality is obtained when Alice gets some secret information from Bob that is only shared by her, Bob, and possibly by some other entity trusted by her; -freshness (or timeliness) means that Alice is assured that the message was sent recently, after she has done a certain action or after a given time; -proof of identity is obtained when Alice is convinced that Bob is really the entity she is communicating with; -proof of delivery means that Alice gets some message that convinces her that Bob received (and read) some crucial information from her; -the wording nonrepudiation usually refers to a mixture of the above in which the evidence in the hands of Alice must be sufficient to convince somebody else (typically Trent).
Most protocols target more than one goal at the same time, or more complex goals such as distributed computation. For instance, in a key agreement protocol, the task of Alice is to get hold of a secret key (confidentiality) so that all subsequent messages she receives encrypted with that key could only come from herself or Bob (authenticity). In a protocol which certifies a public key, the Certification Authority Trent may want a proof of identity: if Alice asks for the public key K A to be certified as hers, then Trent may ask Alice to sign some random number with the corresponding private key, to show that she really knows it. We use the notation of the classical BAN paper [Burrows et al. 1990 ] to represent protocols. The basic building blocks of security protocols are agents' identifiers, keys, and (possibly random) numbers. Agents, and agents' identifiers, are denoted by capital letters: A, B, etc.
According to a notation that is standard in the computer security literature, we call nonces numbers used once, i.e., we assume the availability to each agent of a generator of random numbers ready to provide a new random number whenever needed. We denote nonces by capital N, possibly with an index to specify the agent that produces it. Hence, N A indicates that N is a nonce generated by agent A.
Security protocols often make use of (at least) two types of encryption keys: symmetric keys (sometimes also called shared or secret keys) and asymmetric keys (sometimes also called public/private keys). Basically, we use symmetric keys when our crypto-algorithm can use the same key for both encryption and decryption. Thus, it is essential that the key is kept secret and only shared between those allowed to read the encrypted messages (hence the names "shared" or "secret" key).
We use asymmetric keys when the crypto-algorithm uses a key for encryption and another key for decryption, and it is difficult (unless NP = P or other similarly hard problems turns out easy) to obtain one from the other. With asymmetric keys, Alice can "publish" the encryption key (thus called her "public key") so that everybody can send her secure messages that only she can read by using the decryption key which she carefully guards (hence the name "private key"). Asymmetric keys are also used for signature schemes: when Alice wants to sign a message M she encrypts it with her (private) key. She is the only one who can do that. Using the public key, everybody else can recover the original message, and check that the signature is valid. See Schneider [1994] for further details.
A key K is decorated by indices that denote the agents that know that key: K A is a key known (only) to agent A; K AB is a key shared by agents A and B; etc. Public and private keys are sometimes prefixed by the letters "p" or "s". For instance, pK(A) is A's public key, and sK(A) is A's secret key.
To compose messages, we can use (at least) concatenation, hashing, and encryption. We denote the concatenation of message m 1 and m 2 as m 1 || m 2 . The hashing of a messagge m is denoted by h(m).
Following the standard practice of security verification literature, the encryption of message m with key k is denoted by {m} k for both symmetric and asymmetric encryption. The type of encryption is determined by the type of the key.
To exemplify our specification methodology in AL SP , we focus here on a simple example: a variant of the ISO Challenge-Response protocol. More complex examples such as the classical Needham-Schroeder protocol and the Aziz-Diffie key agreement protocol are discussed by Carlucci Aiello and Massacci [2001] . Further examples, and in particular the whole Clarke-Jacob's library of authentication protocols [Clark and Jacob 1997] , which is the current benchmark for verification of security protocols, has also been encoded in AL SP [Lorenzon 2000] .
Using BAN notation, the Challenge-Response protocol is the following:
The goal of the Challenge-Response protocol is to assure Alice that Bob is alive on the network. To accomplish this goal, Alice generates a nonce N A and encrypts it with a secret key which is only shared by her and Bob. Then she sends the encrypted data to Bob. Bob decrypts the data and sends it in clear. When Alice receives N A back, which she knows she has just generated in order to send it to Bob, and thus it is fresh and unguessable by others, she is sure that only Bob could have sent it by decrypting her challenge, and thus Bob is alive.
Here, each agent participanting in the protocol can play any of the two roles: challenger and responder. These roles can also be played in parallel. For instance, Alice may challenge Bob and respond to Charlie, who is challenging Sam, who is responding to Bob's challenge, etc. All these parallel exchanges of messages can be seen as a single protocol run.
However, if the protocol is run by both Alice and Bob in the attempt to provide a mutual assurance of aliveness, it has a serious flaw. Indeed, there is an attack (in the security jargon, a mirror attack) where Alice successfully completes a run of the protocol, allegedly with Bob, but Bob neither sent nor received any message.
Basically, the intruder intercepts the message from Alice to Bob and feeds it back to Alice (pretending it comes from Bob). When Alice dutifully replies with the challenge (her original challenge indeed), the intruder intercepts it and feeds it back again to Alice claiming to be Bob. The attack is automatically found by smodels in few seconds, when checking the AL SP specification of the protocol. See Figure 1 (Section 9) for a sample output session of smodels.
LOGIC PROGRAMS WITH NAF, STABLE MODELS, AND SMODELS
In this section we give the basics of logic programming needed for our modeling tasks, and refer to Apt [1990] for further details.
It is well known that negation can be accommodated into logic programming as negation as failure (NAF). This is done by extending the language of Horn Logic by allowing negated literals in the body of clauses. In their simplest form, programs with negated literals (called normal logic programs) are sets of rules of the form One of the most prominent semantics for normal logic programs is the stable model semantics proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [1988] (see Apt [1990] for a discussion). The intuition is to interpret the rules of a program P as constraints on a solution set S for the program itself. S is a set of atoms, and a rule of the form
is a constraint on S stating that if b 1 , . . . , and b m are in S and none of c 1 , . . . , and c n are in it, then a must be in S.
We now consider ground rules, i.e., rules where atoms do not contain variables (but may contain arbitrary terms).
Definition 3.1 [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988 ] . The reduct P S of a ground logic program P with respect to a set of atoms S is the definite program obtained from P by deleting (1) each rule that has a negative literal not c in its body with c ∈ S; (2) each negative literal in the bodies of the remaining rules.
The reduct P S is a definite logic program. Let M(P S ) = M P S be the semantics of the definite logic program P S , i.e. its minimal model. The set S = {s, p} is not a stable model of P , as the reduct of the program P S with respect to S is the rule p ← r and its deductive closure is the empty set.
Example. The logic program { p ← not p , p. p ← } has no stable model. In fact, if it had one, say S, then p ∈ S. If p ∈ S, then the reduct is just p ← and p does not derive from it; hence p ∈ S, a contradiction. If p ∈ S, then the reduct is { p ← p. p ← } and p derives from it; hence p ∈ S, a contradiction.
If we remove the second rule, and the logic program becomes { p ← not p , p} then it has a stable model, namely the empty set (i.e., everything is false).
The definition of stable models captures the two key properties of solution sets of logic programs.
( [Burrows et al. 1990] or the SVO logics [Syverson and van Oorschot 1994] ), where together with the intended model we get unwanted ones, and there is no possibility of ruling them out. The definition of stable models in terms of fix points is nonconstructive. Nevertheless, given a set of atoms it can be checked in linear time whether or not it is a stable model [Apt 1990 ]. Even though computing stable models has been proved to be NP-complete, now there are systems that can cope with ground programs having tens of thousands of rules. The system smodels [Niemelä 1999; Niemelä and Simmons 1997] , is one of them. In order to introduce it, we present some more notions.
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Definition 3.3. [Apt 1990 ] The stable models of a normal logic program P with variables are those of its ground instantiations P H with respect to its Herbrand universe.
If logic programs are function free, then an upper bound on the number of instantiations is rc v , where r is the number of rules, c the number of the constants, and v the upper bound on the number of distinct variables in each rule.
Definition 3.4 [Niemelä 1999 ] . A logic program P is domain restricted for a set of predicates D if, for each rule in P , every variable of the rule appears also in a positive body literal of the rule and the predicate of the literal is from D.
Programs where variables are sorted, i.e., where each variable occurring in a rule also occurs as the argument of a sort predicate 2 in the body of the same rule, are domain restricted to the domain of the sort predicates. This property holds for the logic programming language AL SP . Actually, we allow for functions in AL SP programs, but we still keep the domain restrictedness because we impose that arguments of functions are sorted and range over finite domains.
Definition 3.5 [Niemelä 1999] . Let P be a logic program domain restricted for a set of predicates D. LetD be a set of ground instances of predicates in D, and PD be the corresponding grounding of the program P . ThenD is complete for P iff for each ground instanced of a predicate d ∈ D it holds that (i) ifd is in some stable model of P , thend ∈D and (ii) ifd is in some stable model of PD, thend ∈D. Domain restriction is a limitation that still leaves logic programs with expressive power to deal with interesting applications. At the same time the above theorem ensures that with this limitation the grounding problem and the search for stable models can be solved very efficiently, in particular if the domain is nonrecursive, i.e., D does not contain predicates that are recursively defined in P .
Again, AL SP enjoys this property. In fact, the above theorem tells, that without losing completeness of the search, we may limit the ground instances in PD to those where each literal with a predicate from D belongs toD.
smodels [Niemelä and Simmons 1997; Niemelä 1999 ] is an implementation of LP SM , logic programming based on the stable model semantics for rangerestricted function-free normal programs. It consists of two modules: the proper smodels, which implements LP SM for ground programs, and lparse, an efficient parsing module which works for range-restricted programs with nonrecursive domains. lparse automatically detects domain predicates, and deals with them very efficiently. In addition, it has some built-in arithmetic functions.
The implementation of smodels is a mixture of bottom-up and top-down backtracking search, where only the negative atoms in the program contribute to an increase of the search space; hence it is very efficient.
smodels offers the possibility of including a "choice" rule into logic programs:
It reads as "if a and b are both true, then c may be in the stable model, but this is not mandatory." A program containing the choice rule can be translated into a normal program by a wise use of NAF. So, this rule is just a shorthand notation.
The language AL SP borrows the choice rule from smodels, as it proves useful when representing security problems. For instance, it allows us to easily represent the fact that an intruder may intercept a message, but he is not compelled to.
LOGICAL APPROACH TO PLANNING
Planning is a research area in artificial intelligence aiming at the construction of algorithms (planners) that enable an agent to synthesize a course of actions that achieves its goals. Here we only present the definition of a planning problem and give enough background on the approach we take to represent the problem of verifying security protocols as a planning problem. We refer to Weld [1999] for a comprehensive survey.
A planning problem is a representation, in some formal language, of the following three aspects:
(1) a description of the initial state of the world; (2) a description of the goal state the agent has to achieve; (3) a description of the possible actions that can be performed by the agent. This is often called domain theory or action theory.
The solution of the problem (if one exists) is a plan: a sequence of actions that, when executed in a world satisfying the initial state description, achieves the goal. In addition to the description of a planning problem, a planner may need a background theory, i.e., a description of generally known properties about the world.
A planning problem in the context of security protocols, where agents exchange messages and are subject to attacks by intruders, can be formulated as follows:
(1) the initial state is described in terms of the keys known to agents and the messages already exchanged (typically none), at the time the protocol starts;
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If a solution of the planning problem exists, then it is a sequence of actions leading to an unwanted situation, i.e., a plan is an attack to the security of the protocol.
The background theory, in this case, includes the description of how messages are composed and decrypted by agents, the properties of keys, how knowledge is attained by the agents participating in the protocol, etc.
In classical planning problems, a number of simplifying assumptions are made, some of them are absolutely not trivial to be removed: atomic time (or, equivalently, instantaneous duration of action execution), no exogenous events, deterministic action effects, etc. and are presently topics of active research.
We live with these assumptions, since they do not create problems with our application. In our application of planning to security, actions possibly performed by an intruder are not considered exogenous, as they are explicitly modeled. The intruder is one of the several agents in the scenario, typically more powerful than others.
A key problem is finding the adequate representation language: we look for a concise representation of dynamic situations (actions change the state of the world) that allows for an easy search for plans. Both specialized planning formalisms and logics have been proposed for representing and solving planning problems.
Usually, to represent predicates and functions whose value changes over time, fluents are introduced, i.e., predicates/functions with an extra parameter, typically the last one, representing the situation s or the time t where they hold. As an example: got(alice, m, s 1 ), and ¬got(alice, n, s 2 ) indicate that the agent alice got a message m in situation s 1 whereas she did not get it in situation s 2 .
The term situation is borrowed from the Situation Calculus (SitCal), a "dialect" of first-order logic introduced by McCarthy and Hayes [1969] , and recently revisited by Reiter [1991] . We borrow more nomenclature from the SitCal to further illustrate action theories and how security protocols can be accommodated into them.
In SitCal actions are denoted by function symbols; they can be performed in a situation, and the result is a new situation. In general, a situation is a term of the form do(a n , do(a n−1 , . . . , do(a 1 , s 0 ) . . .)) where do is a binary function symbol which, given an action a and a situation s, evaluates to its successor situation, and the constant symbol s 0 denotes the initial situation. Hence, situations can be seen as histories, or traces, of plan executions.
This description of actions is fairly close to Paulson's inductive presentation of security protocols which uses traces of atomic send and receive actions [Paulson 1998; Bella and Paulson 1998 ].
Actions modify the current status of the world. This is described by stating causal laws, i.e., how actions affect the values of the fluents, in the form of the so-called effect axioms. For example, if a number N is part of another message M, then the action of an agent A sending the message M in a situation S causes the number N to be used. Thus, in all subsequent times, N has lost the property of being a freshly generated, unused number. Formally the effect axiom is the following:
The effect of an agent getting a message can be described as
Actions may have preconditions, i.e., requirements to be satisfied in order for the action to be executable. The predicate symbol Poss is used to indicate that all the preconditions are satisfied; hence an action is possible: Poss(a, s) reads as "action a is possible in situation s." In SitCal, an axiom called action precondition axiom is associated with each action a. It has the form
where a (S) is a first-order formula with no occurrence of the function symbol do. Note here that we make a sort of "closure" assumption, i.e., all the necessary and sufficient conditions for the execution of action a are listed in a (S). In other words, we ignore all the other qualifications for the execution of a, by considering them irrelevant. 4 For example, we have
meaning that the (only) preconditions for the capture of a message by the spy in the situation S is that the message has been sent by A to B and that the legitimate recipient has not got it already. In addition to the specification of the effect axioms and the action precondition axioms, we have also to state the "laws of inertia" for our domain, i.e., actions change the value of some fluents; all the others are unaffected, so their truth value persists through the action execution. 5 As an example, intercepting a message does not change its content, the status of other messages already sent by the agents participating in the protocols, the encryption keys used for them, and so on.
In summary, a domain theory in SitCal consists of a set of actions and a precondition axiom for each action, and effect and inertial axioms for each fluent.
With a suitable definition of a domain theory and a rich background theory we would have had Paulson's inductive specification of security protocols, but for notational presentation: the value of each fluent would have been given by stating inductive definitions over traces of actions. Then we could have used Reiter's deductive approach to planning in SitCal [Reiter 1991 ] to obtain a plan (i.e., security attacks) out of a constructive proof of the formula ∃S.Violation(S) from the domain theory and the properties of the initial situation. This would have given us an elegant duality between verification (by inductive theorem proving) and debugging (by finding attacks as plans).
Unfortunately, such an approach proved to be unworkable in practice: a number of preliminary experiments run with P. Baumgartner and U. Furbach from Koblenz University in October, 1999, have shown that state-of-the-art theorem provers (such as SPASS, FDPLL, or PROTEIN) could not cope even with our expository Challenge-Response protocol with the standard SitCal formulation.
The source of the problem can be identified, in our opinion, in the representation of parallel actions by their interleaving into a serial trace. If there are few possibilities for parallelism, this is not a major problem. If the domain allows for many unrelated parallel actions (and this is our case), the representation of interleavings blows up the search space. We illustrate this with an example on our Challenge-Response protocol. Alice may run the protocol with Bob, while Charlie runs it with Eve. Clearly, to find an attack on Alice's run, the outcome of Charlie's run is immaterial. However, the planner does not know it, and thus it will consider all possible interleavings of Alice and Charlie's runs. In particular, it will waste its time by considering the interleaving of Alice's correct runs with all possible runs by Charlie, whereas the attack is elsewhere.
Thus, we need to look at situations in a different way, which do not force parallel actions into serialized traces. We may consider a situation as a set of predicates that are true in it, each situation being distinguished by a timestamp, the time when it was generated by the execution of an action. By the close-world assumption, we read as false all predicates not occurring in the set.
Time arguments t are associated with values from an initial segment of the natural numbers; hence we can speak of a time T 0 = 0, of a total order among timestamps, of a successor time to t, namely t + 1, etc. The explicit representation of time has an added advantage when modeling security protocols which use timestamps (Kerberos is the paradigmatic example), as many protocols use digital certificates, and we may want to add checks on the expiration dates of certificates.
Fluents, instead of being decorated with a situation argument, have a time argument. We also decorate actions with a timestamp, so do(a, s) now becomes an action predicate a(t) which is true when action a is executed at time t yielding some results at time t + 1. Then, we can easily express parallelism: if a(t) and b(t) are both true then the actions a and b are executed in parallel at time t. This still leaves the possibility of considering plans as traces of action executions, with the proviso that (i) two different traces may lead to the same situation, (ii) we must add conditions to guarantee that parallel actions are serializable.
Causal laws and laws of inertia can be recast as constraints on the possible sets of predicates that are admissible for consecutive times t and t + 1. For instance, if the action predicate says(A, B, M, t) is true, then said(A, B, M , t +1) must be true. The planning problem becomes the problem of finding a time t g such that Goal(t g ) holds (where Goal(t g ) is the conjunction of the (relevant) formulas true in the goal state) and a set of actions (indexed by time instants) that leads to t g and respects the causal and inertial laws. In particular, since situations are no longer totally ordered by a sequence of do's, and the time indexing imposes a temporal sequence only on some actions, parallelism among actions can be exploited to make plans shorter.
Following a proposal by Kautz and Selman [1992] , we may solve a planning problem as model finding. The basic intuition is to limit the size of plans (by considering plans whose length l is l ≤ n for some fixed n) and then encode the planning problem as a satisfiability problem in propositional logic by encoding each causal and inertial constraint as a propositional formula. If we find a model for the goal and all the formulae, then we have a plan.
Plans can be also generated using logic programs. In particular, this has been done by Niemelä [1999] and Nebel and coworkers [Dimopoulos et al. 1997 ]. Both of them encode a planning problem as a ground logic program (written in LP SM ) in such a way that the stable models of the encodings correspond to valid sequences of actions. Consequently, planning is the problem of finding a stable model that, for a given instant of time t, assigns true to all fluents that belong to the final situation. Action predicates that are true in the stable model and refer to time instants earlier than t constitute a plan that achieves the goal. Niemelä and Nebel both use smodels for their experiments.
We build on this idea, as smodels can be used for model generation of AL SP specifications to verify whether plans to attack a protocol exist.
THE LANGUAGE AL SP
We start by introducing basic sort predicates to characterize the basic components of our language. Some of these predicates are common to many protocols:
Then we have constructors for messages. Some "classical" constructors are pairing, encryption, hashing, and exclusive-or, which we represent in BAN-like notation [Burrows et al. 1990 ]:
-{M } K is the encryption of M with the key K;
Other functions may be added for particular protocols. From the standpoint of logic programs, they are just function symbols. For instance {M 1 ⊕ M 2 } K is just a pretty printing of the term crypt(K,xor(M1,M2)).
A special sort predicate is msg(M ), which denotes that M is a valid (sub)message that may appear in a run of the protocol. The predicate msg(·) specifies how messages are built with message constructors from basic components. For sake of efficiency, 6 it is sometimes desirable to have a predicate protmsg(M ) which distinguishes actual messages that can be sent/received in a protocol run from valid (sub)messages identified by msg(M ).
We have predicates for defining properties of messages: Other predicates may be introduced on demand. Next, we introduce fluents corresponding to actions and properties, as we discussed in Section 4.
First, we have predicates for knowledge and ability to compose messages. From now on we must introduce time as an additional argument. These actions are basically present in the inductive theory of traces by Paulson and Bella [Paulson 1998; Bella and Paulson 1998 ]. Together with the predicate knows(A, M , T ), they are the only predicates typeset in italics, as they are the only ones whose truth value we need to know for extracting attacks from stable models. We also use the predicates said(A, B, M , T ), got(B, M , T ), and noted(A, M , T ), with the obvious meaning that they are true when the corresponding action happened some time before T . We prefer this solution w.r.t. the explicit temporal operators, as for instance proposed by Syverson and Meadows [1996] , because it leads to simpler semantics and gives us the flexibility to explicitly axiomatize when and how information about past runs of the protocol carries on into the current run. For instance, if we want to model agents with bounded memory, we may have a Lost action which can make noted(A, M , T ) no longer true.
MODELING MESSAGES, KNOWLEDGE, AND ACTIONS IN AL SP
The starting point is the background theory for modeling the ability of agents to manipulate messages.
First, we specify which messages are valid. The direct approach would be using msg(·) and defining messages inductively with constructors. For instance
could be a rule for inductively defining message concatenation. Unfortunately, inductively defined predicates with function symbols have infinitely many ground instances.
For our particular application, we do not need inductive definitions for msg(·): it is sufficient to use only messages that may occur as (sub)messages in a possible run of a protocol. For instance, the concatenation of thousands of nonces will never appear in the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol, and if it does it will be ignored by all honest agents. In most protocols, even complex ones, the format and number of valid messages is fixed 9 and can be expressed by few applications of the constructors to elements of the basic types.
Therefore we impose two constraints:
Definition 6.1. A basic sort predicate is admissible for AL SP if it is not recursively defined by logic programming rules. Definition 6.2. A logic programming rule defining message constructor(s) with the special sort predicate msg(·) in the head of the rule is admissible for AL SP only if basic sort predicates alone occur in the body of the rule.
Obviously if we introduce the additional predicate protmsg(·), which is just a special case of msg(·), then Definition 6.2 must be extended to it. This is the only part of AL SP specifications in which we forbid inductively defined predicates. The gain is substantial: if we have finitely many basic entities (agents, nonces, etc.), then we have finitely many messages in AL SP , and therefore we have only finite models. The price to pay is that the rules defining msg(·) depend on the particular protocol we are analyzing. We must define each submessage in terms of the atomic components.
For our running example this boils down to
This step is entirely mechanical. Thus a translator has been implemented [Lorenzon 2000 ] for generating such AL SP -rules from protocol descriptions in CASPER [Lowe 1998 ]. Next, we need rules to model the ability of agents of manipulating messages. Lowe [1996] and Schneider [1998] use one relation to model the abilities to 9 The recursive protocol analyzed by Paulson [1998] and Ryan and Schneider [1998] is an exception. compose and decompose messages. Paulson [1998] treats these abilities separately with two relations. We prefer the latter approach: the presentation is simpler, and rules are easier to write.
We start by inductively defining the parts of a message:
Some of our basic objects, typically keys, might have particular properties that we want to model using logic programming rules. This can be done, provided the resulting rules are admissible according to Definition 6.1.
To model private and public keys (see again Section 2) we need to state that a public key is the inverse of the private key and vice versa. To model the fact that asymmetric keys come in pairs we use a binary predicate asymKeyPair(Ks, Kp) in which the first argument is the secret key and the second is the public one.
The following modeling is admissible in AL SP provided that key(·) is a basic sort predicate. In most protocols, each agent has only one such pair (Alice's private key, Bob private keys, etc.), and thus it is desirable to associate each agent A with a function which yields the agent's own private key sK (A), and a function which yields its public key pK(A). These functions must have the appropriate sort key(·). This must be done with care as it may destroy the admissibility of the key(·) sort predicate, or the finiteness of the ground representation of the domain of key(·). However, the domain of the function is restricted to be a basic object (an agent in this case). If we have finitely many basic entities, then we have also a finite ground representation.
We code this new requirement as follows:
If ag(·) is not mutually defined in terms of key(·), which is usually the case, as agents are not keys (although an agent's name may be used as a key or to build keys), key(·) is still a basic predicate. The notation is a bit heavy due to the need of using sort predicates to have domain-restricted programs. In the sequel, for sake of readability, we omit all sort predicates and use the convention that A, B, C, etc. stand for agents, N stands for nonces, T stands for time, K stands for keys, and M stands for messages.
With this "omission" in mind, shared keys can be modeled with admissible predicates as asymmetric keys:
The function shK(B, A) should be of the appropriate sort predicate key(·).
Next, we define what an agent can infer from messages and how the agent can construct messages. In the initial proposals by Lowe [1996] , Schneider [1998] , or Paulson [1998] , knowledge is captured by complex operations or indirectly. In the NRL Protocol Analyzer [Meadows 1994 ], one explicitly represents actions that change the knowledge of agents, such as decrypting messages.
We build upon Paulson's approach, as extended by Bella and Paulson [1998] , who make an explicit use of a predicate knows defined over agents, messages, and traces.
Since the word "knows" has many meaning in the AI and in the security literature (see for instance the substantial difference between Bella and Paulson [1998] , Syverson and van Oorshot [1994] , and Marrero et al. [Clarke et al. 1998 ]), it is important to clarify its meaning: by knows(A, M , T ) we mean that agent A can get hold of M by breaking down messages that were sent, received, or somehow got. We use the predicate knows(A, M , T ) to represent the knowledge that an agent can gather by observing the network traffic directed to himself (or to other agents, if he is the intruder) and by performing cryptographic operations for which he has the right decryption keys. Obviously, this knowledge can then be used to compose other messages, but to this end we will introduce another predicate.
As a consequence of sending and receiving actions, the knowledge of agents will change. However, we do not change state when reasoning about knowledge. Reasoning about knowledge of messages is "instantaneous" and deterministic: as soon as an agent receives the correct bits of information that agent immediately derives all consequences by breaking and decrypting all messages for which he has a key.
With the above interpretation of knows, we can write the first two rules about knowledge: you know something because you either got it or said it to somebody.
As we said in Section 4, this is exactly the way in which model-based planning works: an action happening at a given time (saying a message) implies its preconditions (knowing its content); equally, an action happening at a given time (getting a message) implies its effects at some later time (knowing the message content). See Kautz and Selman [1992] for a further discussion on the adequacy of this specification. Since we decided to make reasoning about Then we need rules to peel constructors off messages:
An observation is needed on the rule for decryption. Even if it is conceptually identical to the corresponding rules in other formal verification papers [Burrows et al. 1990; Lowe 1996; Paulson 1998; Schneider 1998 ] it is not satisfactory from an epistemological point of view: in fact, it is not enough for A to know K I and for K I to be the inverse of K; A should also know that K I is the inverse of K . In practical implementations of security protocols, the information about the key to use may not be specified. 10 The rationale is that whereas legitimate parties in a correct run surely know what key to use, one may not want to make this information available to potential intruders. Here we consider it implicit, and leave the explicit representation of these epistemic notions to future work.
We can also exploit the properties of logic programs with negation as failure: what is not explicitly said is false by default. So, if we do not give a rule for hashing, then we cannot conclude anything about it, i.e., we can not reconstruct a message out of its hash (as expected).
Using the stable model semantics of logic programs has another advantage: we can rule out unwanted models introduced by ungrounded circular reasoning about cryptographic properties; models that are difficult to eliminate with other (monotonic) logics. For example, we can model the exclusive-or operation in AL SP :
Now suppose that with these rules we want to model the knowledge relative to a pay-TV channel. In a pay-TV channel the video signal is xored together with a key and then transmitted on the air. So, if you are a legitimate subscriber and know the key, once you received the encrypted signal video ⊕ key you should be able to recover the video. So, let P be the logic program with the above two rules only, and opportunely grounded over the domain alice, bob, video, and key. If we add to P the two ground facts knows(bob, key, 1) and knows(bob, video ⊕ key, 1) then we can correctly infer that in every stable model of the augmented program it is true that knows(bob, video, 1).
However, if alice is a hacker who just got hold of the encrypted signal on the air, i.e., we add to P the ground fact knows(alice, video ⊕ key, 1), the correct interpretation would be that alice does not know anything else. In firstorder logic, or any other monotonic belief logic, we would have to take on board also the model in which A knows M 1 and M 2 . This knowledge will be self-sustained: we could use the first rule to derive that M 1 is there because M 2 is there, and the second rule to conclude that M 2 is there because M 1 is there. Stable models forbid this (wrong) circular reasoning in AL SP : knows(alice, video, 1) and knows(alice, key, 1) are not grounded in the premise knows(alice, key ⊕ video, 1).
To express the knowledge derived by the ability of composing messages we use another predicate:
Composition, decomposition, decryption, and encryption are, in a sense, instantaneous if you have the right key. It is possible to add explicit enciphering and deciphering actions, but this would make our formalization less declarative and our planned attacks longer (and thus harder to find). We can now build the first part of the action theory in AL SP . The following successor state axioms are intuitive:
We need similar axioms for the pair notes(A, M , T ) and noted(A, M , T ). The first two rules model a causal law (saying something now causes it to be said afterward), and the remaining two rules model the law of inertia.
We have not found the need for forgetful agents in the protocols described and verified so far in the security literature [Clark and Jacob 1997; Schneier 1994] , though there might be esoteric protocols for which we may need to modify the "law of inertia."
Reasoning about freshness of messages is a difficult issue in almost all formalisms, as freshness guarantees are the pillars on which every proof of authentication or security rests (see our discussion of the Challenge-Response example in Section 2 or Schneier [1994] , Burrows et al. [1990] , and Paulson [1998] ). Basically, freshness is guaranteed by the usage of nonces and timestamps, and one needs to model in one's own formalism the following intuition [Burrows et al. 1990 ]:
• L. Carlucci Aiello and F. Massacci If you've sent Joe a number that you have never used for this purpose before and if you subsequently receive from Joe something that depends on knowing that number, then you ought to believe that Joe's message originated recently-in fact after yours.
In other words, we need to model an endless supply of fresh numbers which, once used by somebody in some message, lose the qualification of being fresh. The occurrence of a "once fresh," "never used by anyone before," nonce in a message is the proof that the message is relatively fresh, i.e., it has been composed after the nonce has been firstly generated and used.
To model freshness in AL SP we first introduce a fluent which specifies when something is not surely fresh: used(M, T ) is true when message M has been used by somebody before time T . This is typically used for nonces. The axiomatization is simple:
Since we have parallel actions, these rules are not sufficient to avoid bad surprises when reasoning about freshness of nonces: we must be sure that two agents are not trying to use the same nonce in parallel, which might well be fresh at time T (as none of them used it), but might yield an inconsistent state at T + 1 if both of them used it as fresh.
We can rule out this event with the following rules:
Now we have the machinery to write the preconditions of a protocol step which requires to generate a new nonce N or a new session key K: simply say that fresh(N, T ) or fresh(K, T ). This allows us to decouple the problem of specifying that a protocol is using something fresh, from the problem of specifying how many "potentially fresh" things we have. This is sharply in contrast with the difficulties faced by the CSP-based model-checking approaches [Lowe 1997] where to write the specification of the protocol one must know the available nonces, keys, and agents beforehand. This happens because "freshness" is modeled by assigning a set of nonces to each agent and by duplicating CSP processes, according to which nonce is used in the protocol. In other words, if agent A can use nonce N A1 and N A2 then agent A is modeled by writing two processes: one that uses N A1 and one that uses N A2 . This hard-to-manage modeling capability is also one of the reasons behind the development of the intermediate language CASPER [Lowe 1998 ].
If we allow for infinitely many nonces, session keys, or whatever needs to be freshly generated, we would capture precisely the domain. For practicality, we limit ourselves to finitely many ground instances of the basic sorts and thus only finitely many fresh things.
So far we have applied the fresh(M, T ) rule to all possible messages in a protocol. However, the size of the grounded AL SP specification grows quadratically with the number of agents and messages. In some cases it is convenient to adapt the rule to the protocol and limit M to be a nonce (or key, if fresh sessions keys are distributed by the protocol), and constrain M 1 and M 2 to have the form of the actual messages where such nonces or keys are first introduced. Already the use of protmsg(M i ) substantially simplifies the size of the ground representation. These restrictions are common in other model-checking approaches, either state-based [Mitchell et al. 1997] or process-based [Lowe 1996 ]. Now, we define the preconditions for getting and receiving messages that are independent of the protocol that we want to analyze. As in Bella and Paulson's approach [Bella and Paulson 1998 ], modeling message reception is simple:
{gets(B, M, T )} ← says(A, B, M, T )
We use the choice rule (see Section 3) to specify that if A attempts to send a message M to B at time T , then B may receive it. There are stable models where the message is delivered (the normal execution of the protocol) and stable models where B does not receive the message. In these latter models, the intruder has intercepted the message. Thus, we do not need to explicitly model the action of message interception, as done by Meadows [1994] or Syverson and Meadows [1996] . We can also model delayed delivery by replacing "says" with "said" in the body.
Modeling the intruder, along the classical Dolev and Yao model (see Section 2), is simple:
{gets(spy, M, T )} ← says(A, B, M, T ) {says(spy, B, M, T )} ← synth(spy, M, T )
The intruder may get any message in transit and may say any message (but in both cases needs not to). There will be stable models of the protocol where the intruder does nothing (the correct runs) and stable models where he is busy.
A remark is in order. The rule describing message creation by the intruder can be finitely grounded. For conciseness sake, here we have omitted the domain predicates for messages and agents, but they are present in the actual rule, and with Definition 6.2 they make the rules domain restricted.
Of course, other specifications of the intruder's actions are possible, according to one's own application domain. For instance, the intruder may only read messages but not intercept them; he may only work along some communication lines and not others (e.g., may only grab Alice's messages but not Bob's ones), etc.
MODELING PROTOCOLS IN AL SP
For planning attacks, we need to complete our action theory with the preconditions for the actions of the protocol we want to analyze. This is the part the protocol analyst has to write, as this is also the place where she may wish to make explicit one or more checks she believes should be made before a message is sent or accepted.
To write these rules we simply look at the protocol as specified. Assume that the protocol looks something like
Then, to write down the axiom precondition saying that agent A may send message m to B, we identify the messages that should have been received and sent before m in a correct run, and we write the following choice rule:
Usually, the preconditions for sending message m i by agent A are the actions that agent A has performed up to step i according to his view of the protocol run, plus the additional conditions. The protocol-dependent conditions are typically freshness of nonces or timestamps or additional checks that the protocol analyst wants enforced. The protocol analyst may also weaken the preconditions, w.r.t. those recommended here. For instance, she may state that for sending a message agent A may just look at the last received message. This is sensible if we want to test whether the protocol is secure when using stateless but fast implementations. The choice rule would then become {says(A, B, m, T )} ← got(A, m j r , T ), protocol-dependent literals
In our Challenge-Response protocol, the rules would be
SPECIFYING AN ATTACK
The declarative specification of attacks is also the task of the protocol analyst, as different analysts may disagree on the security properties a protocol should provide (see Gollmann [1996] versus Lowe [1996] ). The protocol analyst must add a rule for a predicate attack, specifying the send or receive events which must be present or absent in a protocol run to constitute a security violation. Specifying "what an attack is" is easy for a security analyst, who knows which security property the protocol claims to achieve. In contrast, finding "how an attack is actually done" is a hard task even for security specialists, and here the usage of automated reasoning tools pays off.
For instance, in Challenge-Response protocols, if the challenger receives the response, he can be assured that the responder actually sent it. So, an attack is simply a protocol run in which the challenger sent the challenge and received the response but in which the responder did not actually respond. Finding such a run, with parallel and interleaved combinations of valid protocol steps, is the difficult part of the analysis and is left to the planner. In a certification protocol, if the certification authority certifies a public key as belonging to an individual, say Alice, then the protocol ought to guarantee that Alice does own the corresponding private key. Again, an attack is simply a protocol run in which the certification authority issued Alice's certificate but Alice did not know the corresponding private key.
The procedure for specifiying attacks is simple and only requires us to look at the description of the protocol. We list below some of the most common cases.
As for authentication attacks, we first list the sequence of messages received by an agent A and the message he sent and received up to the point we want to analyze, i.e., the run relative to A of a correct run. Then we pick up one corresponding send (or receive) action from the "right" agent and state that this action is missing.
Consider again the protocol skeleton presented above, and suppose the run correctly completed for It is the task of the planner to find the attack (if it exists) by finding a stable model of the protocol specifications (background theory and action theory) where attack is true.
Among the protocol-dependent conditions, we may add A = spy, B j = spy, and B i h = spy for all i h as needed. These additional conditions may be weakened if our protocol is supposed to be secure also when some participants are not trusted, as it might be the case for e-commerce protocols.
The specification of the attack is a good blend of operational and declarative specification. We say which bits of a run constitute an attack in terms • L. Carlucci Aiello and F. Massacci of a natural operational semantics; still we are purely declarative. The protocol analyst must only specify what she considers an attack, and she needs not know beforehand whether the potential attack she worries about actually exists.
12 Finding how the attack must be carried out, if it exists, is the task of the planner, which must unroll normal protocol actions into a valid plan.
In our running example we have
To check for confidentiality attacks, we add the literal knows(spy, m, T ) to the goal (if m is the message which is supposed to remain secret) and write the rule
In some cases, to correctly model authentication and confidentiality attacks, it is necessary to add an oops-rule, where the intruder gets hold of past confidential data [Paulson 1998 ]. Typically, one introduces the oops-rule to check the strength of the protocol w.r.t. compromised past session keys or nonces. This is essential to reason correctly for protocols such as NeedhamSchroeder.
The typical format of the oops-rule is
where m is the concatenation of all nonces and session keys exchanged up to m j r . We typically only need one oops-rule for the whole protocol, so that m j r is also the last message exchanged in a correct protocol run. Once we have the oops-rule, we need to slightly change the rules to model attacks by excluding that the oops-rule takes place for the current run:
This rule just says that the allegedly correct run has not been directly compromised by an oops-rule, but does not say anything about past runs which might have been compromised by an oops-event.
MODEL-CHECKING AND VERIFICATION
To summarize, for practical verification of security protocol specifications in AL SP , we can use the smodels system: -we use the AL SP specification of the protocol-independent background and action theories; -we write the AL SP specification of the protocol-dependent part with choice rules for representing the correct execution of the protocol; -we define a rule for the security property (attack) we want to check; -we merge the three specifications, set the maximum execution time of the protocol to t max , and a bound on the number of basic objects (agents, nonces, etc.); -we use lparse to obtain the finite ground representation of AL SP specifications; -we use smodels to look for a stable model of the ground system; -if no stable model exists, then the attack does not exist for all (possibly parallel) interleaved runs of the protocol up to t max ; -if there is a stable model, then we look for the atoms representing actions (says (A, B, 
M, T ), gets(B, M, T ), notes(A, M , T )
) that are true in the model, as they give us the sequence of (possibly parallel) actions that constitute the attack.
If we are looking for confidentiality attacks, then we must also gather the atoms knows(spy, M , t max ) that are true in the model. They represent the knowledge of the intruder at the end of the protocol.
To speed up the search, we may add extra constraints on the rules. For instance, in the action preconditions {says(A, B, M, T )} ← . . . we may add A = B in the body of the rule or not said(A, B, M , T ). These additional facts substantially reduce the size of the ground program which we use for model-checking and do not usually change the possibility of finding attacks. For instance, for A = B, in no protocol does an agent knowingly send a message to himself. He might be fooled into running the protocol with himself (a "mirror attack"), but this typically happens because he is running two protocol instances in parallel, one instance as initiator and one instance as responder. It is the intruder who intercepts the messages and feeds them back to the unsuspecting victim. These attacks are not prevented by this optimization.
In Figure 1 we give an example of a verification session with the ChallengeResponse protocol.
13 smodels found the mirror attack that we have mentioned in Section 2. The number at the right indicates the time instant at which the action takes place.
In this case, the attack that is found is not minimal, in the sense that some steps can be removed from it. Indeed at time 4 we only need the spy to send the nonce n1 to A for the attack to take place. It is interesting to note that the attack is found with practically no search.
• L. Carlucci Aiello and F. Massacci With a larger number of steps the attack is still found, but the number of spurious messages may increase. This depends on the search strategy of smodels: smodels does not search for a minimal stable model, but only for any stable model, so some messages that are not necessary may be inserted. A different ordering of rules in the AL SP specification leads to different spurious messages.
It is important to notice that the presence of spurious messages does not hinder the ability of finding attacks; it just makes it slightly difficult for the human reader to winnow the chaff and get a minimal error trace. This is a common problem of all model-checking tools.
This minimization process can also be partly automated by rerunning smodels with the addition of some constraints that exclude some messages to see whether the attacks continue to materialize or not. In some cases it is possible to impose general constraints (such as the spy should not send a message to an agent if this agent does not receive it, etc.) with the caveat that they may cut also attacks.
ADEQUACY OF AL SP SPECIFICATIONS
An interesting question at this stage is to know how accurate is the AL SP description of this challenging domain.
Obviously, it is impossible to "prove" that AL SP specifications are correct descriptions of implemented security protocols. The validity of a modeling and verification methodology can only be established w.r.t. its usability and its ability to help designers in producing better designs.
Still, it is possible to prove the correctness of specifications w.r.t. other formal models of the same application domain. Here, we focus on the classical DolevYao model of security protocols [Dolev and Yao 1983] which describes protocols as traces of send and receive actions over a network under the control of an active intruder. This is a widely used underlying semantic model adopted by researchers in formal verification [Abadi and Tuttle 1991; Meadows 1994; Lowe 1996; Paulson 1998; Schneider 1998 ].
We focus here on a class of protocols generalizing authentication protocols [Clark and Jacob 1997] , which are the current benchmarks of analysis 14 for formal methods in security protocols.
We call them monotonic (parallel-composable) protocols: the intuition is, that to run the protocol, an agent reacts on the basis of what he has received and sent. No action requires him to check that in the course of its many parallel instances he has not sent or not received some other messages. Protocols are monotonic because of practicality: agents (machines) listen to communication ports over the net, and each time a new connection is attempted, a new child process is spawned which runs the protocol over the newly established connection. To boost parallelism and performance, each process minds its own business, and, each time an action is done and acknowledged, it moves to the next state until the protocol is completed.
All protocols in the 1997 reference survey of Clark and Jacob [1997] are of this kind and, to the best of our knowledge, all security protocols analyzed with formal methods up to now. In the sequel, when referring to protocols we always mean a monotonic (parallel-composable) protocol.
Correctness without an Intruder
At first, we focus on a simple theory without the intruder and show that the inductive modeling of protocols as traces has a tight correspondence with the AL SP semantical models. In this preliminary setting, everybody follows the protocol. 15 We assume a common Herbrand domain of messages as sketched in Section 6. Here functions are injective, and thus equality boils down to syntactic equality.
We assume a domain of agent names and a distinguished domain of traces of actions built by the concatenation of the primitive actions says (A, B, M ) , gets(B, M ), and notes(A, M ) where A, B are agents and M is a message. We use the underlined version says(A, B, M ) to denote the action occurring within a trace and says(A, B, M, T ) to denote the fluent in the AL SP specifications. Many protocols require reasoning about time, and thus we assume a function now(·) defined over a trace that identifies what time it is at any point of the trace. We also allow for natural numbers (time) and the primitive relation • L. Carlucci Aiello and F. Massacci "less-than" which allows us to compare numbers with the current time. We assume that time is monotone and discrete. For instance, if T is a trace and # the concatenation operator on traces, we have that now (says(a, b, m) #T ) = now(T ) + 1, and similarly for the other actions. It is possible to make time continuous, but this complicates the proofs without really improving the modeling capabilities.
Now we are ready to define the protocol model.
Definition 10.1. A protocol P is an inductively defined set of traces, starting from the empty trace, such that all inductive rules are instances of the following schema: "Let act next be an action; let A be a set of actions; let M be the set of (fresh) messages; if the following conditions are satisfied -T ∈ P and -for all act ∈ A, act occurs in T and -for all m ∈ M, m does not occur in T (i.e. it is fresh) and -a conjunction of monadic predicates (or time predicates) over T , the objects occuring in the actions in A and in the action act next ;
then act next #T ∈ P." Equality or monadic predicates may specify roles of agents, such as servers or clients, and temporal relations less-than, greater-than may be used for timestamps. Being inductively defined, traces are finite. We abuse notation and write p ← ∧ i q i for the rule p ← q 1 , q 2 . . . q n .
Definition 10.2. Let P be a protocol. The AL SP specification P is adequate for P if for every rule of the protocol's inductive definition there is a corresponding AL SP rule of the form Obviously, P includes the rules for defining fresh(M, T ), but we do not need anything else (for instance, knows(A, M , T ) is not necessary at this stage).
Then we can prove the following lemma:
LEMMA 10.1. Let P be a protocol over a ground domainD, and let P be an adequate AL SP specification of P. Then, for every trace T ∈ P there is a stable model of P ∪D such that for every action says (a, b, m) in T (respectively, gets(a, m), notes(a, m)) (1) there is a t such that says (a, b, m, t) (respectively, gets(a, m, t), notes(a, m, t)) is in the stable model of P; (2) if says(a , b , m )#T ∈ P (respectively, gets(a , m ), notes(a , m ) ) then there is a t ≥ t such that says(a , b , m , t ) (respectively, gets(a , m , t ), notes(a , m , t )) is in the stable model of P .
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the length of the trace. Basically, the trace itself is the stable model, and nothing else happens.
It is trivially verified for a trace of length zero: the model in which nothing is sent and nothing is received is always a valid stable model of P (all "says" and "notes" are optional, and all "gets" require a "says").
Suppose that the claim holds for a trace of length l . We take the corresponding stable model, which runs up to time t l , and add the (l + 1)th action tagged with t l + 1 by suitably using the fresh constants not yet appearing in any "says" submessage up to time t l (included).
The opposite direction is more complex because of parallelism. In practice we need to prove that we can serialize the parallel actions of the protocol while respecting the ordering constraints.
Remark 10.1. If timestamps and lifetimes are used in the protocol, there are obvious cases where the parallel execution of the protocol cannot be serialized in a trace if the granularity of time is 1.
For instance, suppose that we get a "ticket for services" (such as in Kerberos [Schneier 1994 ]) with a lifetime of 10 units of time. If we are able to make 20 parallel requests of services at each time, we can have 200 requests before the ticket expires. However, once we serialize everything, we can only ask for 10 requests before the expiration time. Thus, we assume that time is discrete, but its granularity can be as small as needed.
LEMMA 10.2. Let P be a protocol over a finite ground domainD, and let P be an adequate AL SP specification of P . Then, for every stable model of P ∪D there is a trace T ∈ P such that for every action fluent says (a, b, m, t) (respectively, gets(a, m, t), notes(a, m, t) ) true in the stable model of P one has (1) says (a, b, m) (respectively, gets(a, m), notes(a, m) 
provided the now() function is discrete but not necessarily with a unit step.
PROOF. The proof is constructive: we construct the trace T out of the stable model. If no "says" action is present in the stable model (and thus no "gets"), we simply take the empty trace.
Suppose that we can construct a valid trace out of a stable model using the actions labeled with the time t, we show how to construct a trace by adding the parallel actions performed at time t + 1.
Let T t be the trace corresponding to time t. We simply take an arbitrary action true at time t + 1, for instance says (a, b, m, t + 1) , and create the trace says (a, b, m) #T . Since the model is stable, there must be some rule to justify the presence of says (a, b, m, t) . Thus its preconditions in terms of what is said, noted, and got must be also true in the stable model. For each of those fluents to be true in the stable model, there must be an action predicate also true at a previous time, e.g., if said(a, b i , m i , t + 1) is in the stable model there must be an action says (a, b i , m i , t ) with t < t + 1 in the stable model.
By inductive hypothesis there is the corresponding says(a, b i , m i ) already in the trace constructed so far. A similar reasoning can be done for freshness constraints: they are not present in any element of the trace encompassing actions performed before time t + 1. Then all the preconditions of the inductive rule are satisfied, and the newly composed trace is a valid trace or P.
Then we repeat the process of picking the next action true at time t + 1 and concatenate it to the trace resulting from the previous step. The reasoning is the same except that now we observe that a fresh object cannot be used in parallel at the same time. Without this additional constraint, we would not be able to "serialize" the actions performed in parallel at time t + 1: the first "says" action added to the trace might have already used up the wrong objects.
We also need the hypothesis of monotonic (parallel composable) protocols. Consider the simple case of two actions done in parallel at time t + 1. From the viewpoint of either action the other action was not done yet. After we serialize them, when the "second" action is added to the trace, the "first" action has been already done. With monotonic preconditions this is not a problem, as we have no precondition on what is not in a trace.
We must now construct the now(.) function. Here we simply construct a function where the increase step is 1 divided by the number of parallel actions at each instant. This is the only place where we need the ground domain to be finite.
Even without an intruder, we can already define the notion of authentication properties. The definition is borrowed from Schneider [1998] and is substantially equal to Paulson's properties [Bella and Paulson 1998; Paulson 1998 ].
Definition 10.3. An authentication property over a set of primitive actions is a pair of finite sets of actions C (for Causes) and E (for Effects). A protocol P satisfies the authentication property C, E iff whenever all actions in E occur in a trace T ∈ P at least one action in C occurs in T .
Definition 10.4. Let C, E be an authentication property over a domain D and a protocol P, and an AL SP specification P . The definition of attack is adequate for AL SP if for all time instants t there is a time t ≥ t in P and a rule of the form attack ← says (a,b,m)∈E said(a, b, m, t) gets (a,m)∈E got(a, m, t) notes (a,m)∈E noted(a, m, t) gets (a,m) ∈C not got (a, m, t) says (a,b,m) ∈C not said (a, b, m, t) notes(a,m)∈C not noted (a, m, t) . No other rule for attack is present.
The condition on the time is essential for the final equivalence result (attacks in the protocol models correspond to stable models where attack is true) to hold. Otherwise there might be stable models where an attack is indeed present, but, because it took longer than expected, the attack atom is not present in the stable model. If time is finite, we only need one rule (for the t max + 1 instant). If time is infinite we need infinitely many rules.
From the previous two lemmas we get the following theorem:
THEOREM 10.3 (SOUNDNESS). Let P be a protocol and C, E an authentication property over a ground domainD. Let P be an admissible AL SP specification such that the ground instance of P ∪D is adequate for P and C, E . If there is a stable model for the ground instance of P ∪D which satisfies the atom attack then there is a trace of the protocol P that violates the authentication property.
PROOF. If time is finite and we only have one rule for attack (for the largest possible time instant) we use Lemma 10.2 to obtain the trace of P corresponding to the stable model. It clearly violates the authentication property because the preconditions in the body of the attack rule are satisfied.
However, if the model is infinite or if we have more than one rule for attack at different time instants, we cannot use Lemma 10.2 to obtain the trace of P: once we unroll the model in a trace it might be, that along the trace, after the attack has taken place, we add all causes, and thus, on the final trace, the authentication property is satisfied. We need to "shorten" the stable model at the right instant.
Since the attack atom is true in the model, there is an attack rule that fires. Let t be the first time instant such that the rule fires. We eliminate from the stable model of P all actions labeled with a time instant equal to or greater than t. As we have remarked, this can always be done, as we are never forced to act, in AL SP specifications.
Then, by using a standard compactness argument, we obtain the minimal, finite set of ground rules which is necessary to derive the atom attack. From this set of ground rules we obtain a finite subsetD f ofD and useD f for grounding P . Then we still have a stable model of the specification, and to this stable model we can apply Lemma 10.2.
The opposite direction can also be proven: THEOREM 10.4 (BOUNDED COMPLETENESS). Let P be a protocol and C, E an authentication property over a finite ground domainD. Let P be an admissible AL SP specification such that all its ground instances for the time instances t = 1, 2, 3 . . . are adequate for P. If there are (possibly parallel) runs of the protocol which violate the authentication properties of P with length at most t max then there is a stable model of the ground instance for t = t max + 1.
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Formal Analysis with the Intruder
In the Dolev-Yao model, the intruder is able to read traffic not directed to him and to send messages without respecting the protocol. Therefore we must be able to reason about its abilities to manipulate messages (the "knows" and "synth" predicates from Section 6).
As for operators on messages, we only need Paulson's inductively defined operators on set of messages: analz, synth, and parts [Paulson 1998 ]. Schneider's and Lowe's operator for their CSP handling of messages can be reconstructed in terms of those three basic operators. Thus we need to show how these inductive operators can be reconstructed by AL SP specifications:
Definition 10.5. Let pSet( t) be an inductively defined set of messages for some elements t of the domainD such that -for the base case m ∈ pSet( t) if the condition on m and t is a conjunction of monadic predicates, equality, or predicates not depending on pSet( t);
-for the inductive cases all inductive rules have the form "if m 1 ∈ pSet( t) and . . . and m n ∈ pSet( t) then m ∈ pSet( t)."
Then the following AL SP specification is adequate for pSet( t) if
-for the base case there is a rule of the form 
In one direction the proof is by simple induction on the construction of pSet( t).
For the other direction we exploit the fact that AL SP models are stable and that there is no other rule for getting pSet( t, m, t 0 ) in the model.
As for operators on traces, we need to define an adequate representation of inductively defined operators of traces of atomic messages: Definition 10.6. Let pTrace(T ) be an inductively defined set of messages for some elements t of the domainD and a trace T of atomic actions such that
pTrace ( t, says(a, b, m) 1 (a, b, m) . . .
where all pSet i ( t) are inductively defined set-predicates according to Definition 10.5 and c i (a, b, m) is a conjunction of (in)equality predicates or other setpredicates, and similarly for notes (a, m) and gets (a, m) .
The AL SP specification is adequate for pTrace( t, ·) if it is adequate for pSet i ( t) for i = 0, 1 . . . and for every rule for pTrace( t) there is an AL SP rule of the form
where domain predicates for all variables are omitted for readability. This occurs similarly for notes (a, m) and gets (a, m) . Moreover, there is no other rule for pTrace( t, m , T ).
Typically one has p 1 = . . . = p k . For example, Paulson uses init(A) as the set of messages initially known to agent A and parts(M ) as the set of submessages of message m and then defines the predicate used to be the following:
Bella's inductive operator knows is the following:
knows (A, says(a, b, m) 
The "knowledge of the intruder" is then defined by the combination of the predicates synth(analz (knows(spy, T )) ). This defines the set of messages that the spy can compose after decrypting all messages she has intercepted in the traffic. These combinations can be simply captured by the obvious concatenation of rules.
• L. Carlucci Aiello and F. Massacci The corresponding adequate AL SP specifications are given in Section 6 for the action predicates knows(A, M , T ) and used(M, T ). In our case, since we have no independent use of analz, but we (and indeed any formal approach to security protocols) only use it in combination with knows, we have merged both of them into our only predicate knows(A, M , T ).
Finally we can upgrade the definition of protocols given in Definition 10.1 by allowing two additional inductive rules:
-if T ∈ P and m ∈ pSet(pTrace(spy, T )) then says(spy, a, m)#T ∈ P.
-if T ∈ P and says (a, b, m) occurs in T then gets(spy, m)#T ∈ P.
Obviously pSet(·) and pTrace(·) depend on the particular model and abilities of the intruder. Almost all models incorporate syntactic variants of the combination of the predicates synth(analz(knows(spy, T ))).
We can now prove the equivalent version of Lemma 10.5 for the trace property pTrace(·). The proof is again by induction on the construction of T where the base case exploits that pSet 0 (·)'s encoding in AL SP is adequate. Notice that for this proof to go through we must define each pSet i (·) separately for each pTrace(·). It is obviously possible to "recycle" the same definition of pSet i (·) for different trace functions, but then the proof must be redone on a case-by-case basis.
Then, one can prove the equivalent of Lemma 10.2 and Lemma 10.1 for the upgraded protocol model with the intruder. These results can be combined, with the same compactness argument used in Theorem 10.3, yielding the final theorems: THEOREM 10.6 (SOUNDNESS WITH INTRUDERS). Let PI be a protocol augmented with an intruder and C, E an authentication property over a ground domain D. Let P be an admissible AL SP specification such that the ground instance of P ∪D is adequate for P and C, E . If there is a stable model for the ground instance of P ∪D which satisfies the atom attack then there is a trace of the protocol PI that violates the authentication property.
Clearly the actions which lead to the attack are identified by the action predicates (says(A, B, M, T ), gets (B, M, T ) , notes(A, M , T )) that are true in the stable model. This is also true when the stable model is infinite, e.g., if we allow for an infinite number of agents and nonces or do not set a bound on the maximum length of possible runs. THEOREM 10.7 (BOUNDED COMPLETENESS WITH INTRUDERS). Let PI be a protocol augmented with an intruder and C, E an authentication property over a finite ground domainD. Let P be an admissible AL SP specification such that all its ground instances for the time instances t = 1, 2, 3 . . . are adequate for P. If there are (possibly parallel) runs of the protocol which violates the authentication properties of P of length at most t max then there is a stable model of the ground instance for t = t max + 1 which contains the atom attack Remark 10.2. For e-commerce and fair-exchange protocols the presence of explicit parallel actions, rather than their interleaving semantics, makes a difference. The so called "optimistic protocols" introduced by N. Asokan et al. [1997] are subject to parallel attacks that can be modeled in AL SP but not with a trace-based model.
RELATED WORKS AND CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the paper we have referred to the differences with some of the stateof-the-art approaches for protocol verification which have been automated. Here we just summarize the main differences.
The NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA) by Meadows [1994] shares with us the choice of the programming paradigm, as we both use logic programs. A key difference is that we use the logic programming language AL SP as specification language, whereas Prolog is used as the implementation language for NPA [Meadows 1994 ]. The protocol description and the specifications for NPA are based on state variables and rules for changing state variables with an explicit modeling of the words learned by the intruder. This aspect of NPA is closer to state exploration tools such as Murphi [Mitchell et al. 1997] .
Security specifications, whose violation may lead to an attack, must be written in a different language either with temporal operators as done by Syverson and Meadows [1996] or by using the CAPSL intermediate language [Brackin et al. 1999] . Such specifications are declarative but not executable [Syverson and Meadows 1996] .
Our current formalization does not cope with an infinite search space, which can be treated by NPA by letting the user introduce some inductive lemmas. Infinite state space (such as an infinite number of agents or nonces) can be modeled in our approach by minor modifications (just add a rule also for agents and nonces indexed by time instants), but the price to pay is that we would lose the finiteness theorem. Another possibility would be to use iterative deepening on t max and the number of basic objects, as this allows us to retain the benefits of the bounded model-checking completeness. We believe, that w.r.t. other modelchecking approaches, the use of a declarative specification language greatly simplifies the presentation of actions and events.
The work on multiset rewriting proposed by Cervesato et al. [1999] extends the semantics of NPA by defining protocols in terms of rewriting rules over sets of messages known by the participating agents. Multiset rewriting turned out to be a useful tool for theoretical analysis for relating various formalisms [Cervesato et al. 2000b; Cervesato et al. 2000a] . However, as a specification language, multiset rewriting turned out to be unfeasible, and the authors had to revert to an intermediate specification such as CIL and then ultimately to CAPSL [Brackin et al. 1999] .
As for the approaches based on theorem proving, we have already pointed out connections between our proposal and Paulson's inductive method [Paulson 1998; Bella and Paulson 1998 ]. Indeed, we have in common the operational semantics for the specification of protocols. In the inductive method one models a protocol as a set of traces and then uses interactive theorem proving to prove that the protocol is secure, i.e., prove that all traces satisfy a desired guarantee. Paulson's theory is richer than ours (as he uses set theory, functions, inductive definitions, etc.), as his objective is theorem proving about all traces. The limit is that inductive theorem proving is interactive and requires expert knowledge, even if current tools substantially help in shortening the verification efforts. Our approach is based on model finding, and thus we look for one trace that satisfies a given property, i.e., a security violation. Thus, by combining techniques from logic programming and planning, we can fully automatize the search for attacks.
AL SP combines these various approaches into a coherent framework. Our formal language allows for a declarative description of the properties of protocols and their operational behavior in term of traces. The use of stable model semantics makes it possible to use powerful tools such as smodels for the automatic verification of the protocol.
AL SP is a good blending of the three contrasting needs: being close to the description of protocols as specified in the security literature, specifying security properties at a high level of abstraction, automating the analysis of the protocols, and the search for bugs (i.e., security attacks). Gollmann [1996, page 53] writes High level definitions of entity authentication may obscure the precise goals an authentication protocol should achieve. On the other hand, a low level description of the cryptographic mechanisms employed in the protocol may obscure their intended purpose.
We believe that our specification language AL SP is a step toward making these ends meet.
To ease comparison and integration with other approaches, a translator from CASPER specifications [Lowe 1998 ] into AL SP specifications has also been implemented [Lorenzon 2000] . This makes it possible to obtain AL SP specifications for all protocols described in CASPER in an almost 16 automatic way. We refer to Carlucci Aiello and Massacci [2001] for a detailed presentation of case studies in AL SP : the Needham-Schroeder protocol, and the Aziz-Diffie key agreement protocol for mobile communication. We plan to extend our verification methodology to more complex protocols such as SET by Visa and MasterCard and test to what extent, in terms of the size of specifications, we can use only general-purpose tools such as smodels for verifying specifications written in AL SP .
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